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[37 C.2d

614

prc>f0rcm•p on the calendar, the court has the power to prevent
thr aecomplishnwnt of that purpose by appropriate order or
proeedure.
[4b] In Columbia P1:ctures Cm·p. v. DeToth, supra (26 CaL
2d 75:3, at 761), it was recognized that the plaintiff's right to
proeeed was not foreclosed by the fact that the contract had
been breached and that other remedies were available. It
was not suggested that if the alternative relief was sought and
was procurable in the action before it the court could entirely
refuse to entertain the cause. In reversing a judgment of dismissal on sustaining the demurrer in Lord v. Garland, 37 Cal.
2d 840, 852-853 [168 P.2d 5], we said that a general demurrer
should be overruled if, upon any theory, the complaint stated
a cause of action. (See, also, Johnson v. Clark, 7 Cal.2d 529,
536 [61 P.2d 767].)
The foregoing sufficiently demonstrates, without extending
the review or multiplying citations, that the plaintiff was and
is entitled to a trial and a judgment on the issues framed by
the pleadings.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Edmonds, .T., Carter, ,J., Traynor, .T., and
Sehauer, .T., concurred.
Rt>spondents' petition for a rehearing was denied Angnst 2:3,
HHil.

(Crim. No. Gl73.

In Bank.

.July 27, 1951.]

'l'HE PEOPlJE, Respondent, v. RAY CUI.JIJEN, Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Corpus Delicti.-In homicide the corpus delicti consists of two elements, the death of the alleged victim and the
existence of some criminal agency as the cause, either or both
of which may be proved circumstantially or inferentially.
[1] See 13 Cal.Jur. 676; 26 Am.Jur. 159.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Homicide, §149; [5,8] Criminal
Law, §279; [6,7] Criminal Law, §280; [9] Criminal Law, §§564,
;)65, 586(2); [10] Criminal Law,§ 636; [11] Criminal Law,§ 1319;
[12] Homicide, § 145; [13] Criminal Law, § 1397; [14] Criminal Law, § 653; [15] Criminal Law, § 533; [16] Criminal Law,
§ 1133; [17] Criminal Law, § 450; [18] Criminal Law, § 97; [19]
Jury,§ 96; [20] Jury,§ 4.
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[2] !d.-Corpus Delicti.-It is not necessary in order to support
a conviction of homicide that the body of the victim actually
be found.
[3] !d.-Corpus Delicti.-Proof of the corpus delicti does not require identification of the perpetrators.
[ 4] !d.-Corpus Delicti.--Motive forms no part of the corpus delicti.
[5] Criminal Law~Corpus Delicti and Admissions.-The corpus
delicti mu;;:t be established independently of admissions of the
defendant.
[ 6] !d.-Corpus Delicti and Admissions.-Full proof of the body
of the crime, sufficient to convince the jury of its conclusive
character, is not necessary before defPndant's admissions may
be received, a prima facie showing that the alleged victim met
death by a criminal agency being all that is required.
[7] Id.- Corpus Delicti and Admissions.- Upon a prima facie
showing that the alleged victim of a homicide met death by
a (•riminal agency the defendant's extrajudicial statements become admissib!P., the order of proof being discretionary, and
together with the showing must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
(8] !d.-Corpus Delicti and Admissions.-The purpose of the rule
requiring that the corpus delicti must be established independently of defendant's admissions is to protect him from the
possibility of fabricated testimony which might wrongfully
establish the crime and the perpetrator.
[9] Id.-Evidence.-That the circumstantial evidence must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with an hypothesis of innocence, and that the proof of the corpus delicti and the identity
of the perpetrator must resolve the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, are rules of instruction for the guidance of the jury.
[10] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Drawing Inferences.-It is
the jury's function to draw the proper inferences from the
proof of the circumstancf)S.
[11] !d.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.--It is not the reYiewing court's province to oYerturn the jury's verdict where
it is supported by substantial evidence including the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom.
(12] Homicide--Evidence.-A prima facie showing of the corpus
delicti sufficient to allow a homicide case, together with defendant's admissions, to go to the jury is made, and verdicts of
first degree murder are sustained, by evidence that, among
other things, df'fendant's wife and father-in-law, who had been
living with him, were not seen after a certain date, jewelry
similar to that worn by her at the time of disappearance was

!d.-Province of Court and Jury-Questions Relating to Evidence.-lt
for the court to determine whether a
facie
the corpus delicti suffieicnt for
of dedeclarations has hePn made.
[15] !d.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence.-Certain and
tive identification of
and other exhibits as being· the
homicide is not essential to their
of
and
vHCCWCHU

[16]
late court will not disturb the trial court's ruling, refusing to
eertain records as to a real property sale and
extended cross-examination on the subject, grounded
of the evidence, where materiality of the proevidence is not disclosed
the record.
[17] !d.-Evidence-Self-serving Declarations.-Prejudicial error
does not result from refusal to appoint a psychiatrist to examine a defendant in a homicide case while under the influence of
sodium pentathol and from rejection of his offer of proof
as to the
of the result, since the admissibility of
and the offer of proof indicates
that
to be produced would be hearsay, selftheir truth
dependent on the
enue--IJn<otnJ~e of Venue-Rearing and Determination.
-The court does not 11 buse its discretion in
a motion
for
of
of trial of a homicide prosecution,
the motion is submitted on conflicting
davits from which the court may conclude that no reasons
defendant cannot he tried impartially by the jury
defendant fails to exhaust his peremptory challenges
and
the emut's ofier to order a
venire.
[19] Jury- Challenges to Panel Determination-Review.-The
court does not ahuse its discretion in disallowing a challenge
to the
in a homicide ease, where no support appears

[20] Id.-Alternate Jurors.-Xo
the

taken under Pen.
Court of Riverside

0.
Prosecution for murder.
death
affirmed.

of conviction

and Robert JYI. Wiley for
Pred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General,
Elizabeth
Deputy Attorney General, William 0.
Mackey, Distriet Attorney (Riverside) aml Ray 'I'. Sullivan,
Assistant District Attorney, for Respondent.
SHENK, J.-'l'he defendant was tried by a jury and found
guilty on two counts of murder in the first
without
recommendation. 'l'he death penalty was imposed and this
automatic
followed. 'fhere was no motion for a new
trial.
By indictment the defendant was charged with the murder
of his wife, Mary Cullen, and of her father, Daniel T. Boyer,
on or about January 3, 1949, in Riverside County. The indictment also alleged two prior convictions, assault with a
deadly ~weapon and counterfeiting. The indictment was returned on 1VIareh 1, 1950, and the defendant was arraigned
on March 6th. He was then present without counsel and the
public defender was appointed to represent him. A motion
to dismi;;;s the indictment on the ground that the defendant was
denied a
trial was denied. The defendant pleaded
not
and admitted the alleged prior convictions. April
25,
was
as the date when the trial should
commence. In the interim the
moved for a change
of
of trial to the
of Fresno on the
that
of Riverside County were so
against him
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that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in that county.
The motion was denied. At the defendant's request another
attorney was associated in his behalf with the public defender.
On May 2, 1950, after examination of the veniremen, the
defendant challenged the entire panel and renewed his motion
for change of venue. 'l'he challenge was disallowed and the
motion denied. After a protracted trial the case was sub.
mitted to the
on the instructions of the court at 6 :51
p. m. of ,July 21, 1950. 'l'he
returned the verdicts at
12:30 a.m. of July 22d.
'l'he record discloses the following: On August 17, 1948,
the defendant, then about 61 years of age, and Mary Cullen
who was about 57, were married in Yuma, Arizona. They
lived in the defendant's cabin on the west bank of the Colo·
rado River in a sparsely settled region of Riverside County
about 3 miles from the town of Blythe. Mary had been previ.
ously married and owned a home in Colton which she rented
after her marriage to the defendant. She owned real property
in San Bernardino and owned but had sold real property in
Yucaipa. She took with her to the home near Blythe rather
complete household furniture, furnishings and appliances. She
had three grown sons, Frank, Al, ·and William Patton, who
lived in Southern California. She had three sisters including
Sophie Patton and Bessie Hart. These relatives visited and
corresponded with her frequently. In December, 1948, Mary's
father, Daniel '1'. Boyer, about 81 years of age, went to live
with the Cullens. He was a war veteran and received a monthly
pension check of $120.
Sometime in December, 1948, Mary Cullen began preparations for leaving Blythe and returning to her Colton resi·
dence. She made arrangements for a furniture dealer to buy
some and to remove other appliances and items of furniture to
Colton. She packed her belongings preparatory to hauling
them in her car which she had reconditioned for the journey.
She wrote to her son William about December 29th saying she
did not "want anything from him only to get away," and
again on the 31st that as soon as she could sell she was ''com.
ing down,'' and that she had asked the tenants for possession
of her house in Colton by February 1st. Her son AI and sister
Sophie also received letters written the same day. They did
not hear from or see her thereafter. Mary Cullen and her
father were seen the last times at the Cullen horne on Janu.
ary 2, 1949, at 12 :30 p.m. by a neighbor who called after
she had observed the defendant depart for Blythe, and in the
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afternoon about 3. Their disappearance was
and
t hRre has been no trace of them Rither alive or dead.
The defendant was employed at a cafe in Blythe and his
shift eommenced about noon. He usually drove to town with
Mary and hPr fathPr about 10 in the morning, and returned
h0fore
for work He was not observed to ma1m his
('ll~tomary
trip on Monday, ,January 3, 1949, but
drparted for his employment as usuaL On that day be preRf>nted to th<> bank in Blythe for payment and collected the
proeerds of Boyf>r's pension ebeck of $120 endorsed with
thf> names "Daniel T. Boyer" and "Ray Cullen."
At 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, January 4th, men from the
sheriff's office took a boat on a routine patrol of the river.
Thry passed the <:ullen place and saw no activity, but about
a quarter of a mile below they observed an unoccupied boat
nrar thr California bank right side up and stopped by a
piece of driftwood, but they did not examine it further. About
that time the defendant entered the office of a real estate broker
whom be had previously eonsultr,d about selling his place on
the river. The defendant told the broker that his wife and
her fathrr had drowned when they were ont in a boat trying
to get a duck which they had shot that morning while the
(]efendant was working around the place; that he had heard
thr motor sputtPr and after a few minutes looked to see what
thry were doing and that he didn't see them any more. He
Rairl he had bern trying to locate them and offered $100 to
anyonr who found them. The broker said it was not necessary,
that all hr had to do was to eall the shrriff's office. About noon
thr rlefrndant appearrd at the sheriff's office and asked where
lH' eou]d grt a boat to look for his wife and her father who
had rlisapprared that morning; that the last he had sem of
thrm thry werr drifting down the river and he was certain
thry would dro·wn if he eould not get help at once. He was
tolrl that a boat had gonP dowm;t:ream and would probably
rrvrrtakr them and tow them to a landing. On his return to
nl~·thr he rrportrd to a nrighhor that Mary Cullen had shot
a duek and with hrr father had gone out in a boat and he
IYas afraid something had happened to them. About 6 o'clock
on the morning of either Tuesday or Wednesday the defendant appeared in his red "pick-up" truck at a service station.
His shoes and the bottom of his trousers were muddied. He
said he guessed his wife had drowned; that she had shot a
eouple of durks thP evPning br:f'ore she had gone with her
fathrr in a boat to pick thrm np; that he had not been able to

who
found the Cullen boat a
mile downstream 10 feet from
the bank "lvith 16 feet of chain attached
fallen Ynr,onnn

whieh with the gas shut
thr
in the
swimmer.
4th the defendant
On
of
l iarn Patton in San Bernardino and
that his mother
and
were lost in the river and
had boats out
for thrm. Six relatives and friends
arrived that
in the house but the
defendant
a few minutes before
their call.
in the house was neat and clean. :M:arv Cullen's
and
's
were
but not the defendant's.
A .22-.410 over-and-under gun that William had
to his
mother was
in a corner. He broke the gun and saw
that the .410 barrel vvas loaded and that the .22 barrel was
empty. William took off his shoes to lie on the davenport and
stepped on a rug which wet the sole of his foot. Al Patton
noticed another wet rug. The defendant explained that Mary
had washed the rugs and
had frozen.
\vhieh he usually wore, was on the buffet. The next morning
the)·
the icebox and Raw only some mildewed food and
rgg·s. During the night the def0mlant was
at intervals
outside the house, and just before daybreak for about a half
hour. On being questioned he reported that he had picked
11p Boyer's pension check at the
delivery window and
that
had cashed the check himself when the defendant
took him into town on Monday.
on the 6th, he said
that
\Yas too sick to go to town but had endorsed the
<·1wek anr1 that he
had eashed it. The evithe conclnsion that the defendant
name
the endorsement. TJmt fart was established
herein·
on the eonvictim1 of tl1e dei'endant of such
after related.
Aftc·r
on the 5th the
examined
boat and
it to search the river.
also hired an air])lmw to
The defendant aided in these
S('arehes.
left the Cullen home on the 6th at the
office after
the de-
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alHl another
which resemCullen. The defendant had said
her
at the time of her
anee. Sonw other articles of her
her button box in the attie. She was
abuut $700 in cash which was neyer found.
'I'ests showed traces of blood in the ·washed rugs in the living
room, in the
which also had been
and in
the woodwork above the
A
in the floor had
been
and blood
were found between the
floorboards. Blood 'Was fonnd on the door jamb of the back
door. Mary's raincoat and
's hat showed traces of
blood. A
of cotton
purchased for the defendant
the Pattons \Yas later found with blood and sand on the
outsiil•"· Blood was also found from the kllee downward on
the
kg and oll the upper part of the left leg of a nearly
ne\Y
of
A small clot of previously semicoagulated
blood 1-ra:-; found on the ribbon band of a hat. Blood was also
found on the left shoe of a pair of black shoes, on a pair of
brown
which had been
and on an outing
flannel sheet.
'l'he officers conducted a continuous river search for the
bodies for abont a month, and after that at intervals. Evidenee
as to the probability of recovery from the Colorado River
>Yould
the inference that if
and her father had
their bodies would have been recovered.
The defendant was arrested on February 11th, 1949, on a
of
the endorsement on Boyer's pension check.
He wa"
and the judgment was affirmed on appeal.
(People v. Cullen (Sept. 18, 1950), 99 Cal.App.2d 468 [221
P.2d 10161.) On him at that time were found photographs of
Mary Cullen. On the back of each of two was written in his
handwriting: ''In Memoriam. My dearly beloved and pre-
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do us
Departed from this life January 4, 1949. Rest
in peace, Dear One. Born July 17, 1891." 'rhe writing was
in ink except that the figure 4 in ''January 4'' was in pencil.
A possible murder charge was mentioned to the defendant.
He said
couldn't try him on a murder charge because
didn't have any corpus delicti. Asked what he meant
he said: ''You can't prove a man guilty of murder without
produdng the
which is the corpus delicti.'' Later,
told of the futile river search for the bodies and asked his
advice about continuing, he said: "Well, I wouldn't look for
them there anymore. It is just a waste of time because you
won't find them there . . . I am not saying they are not in
there. I just told you you won't find them there.''
After he was in jail members of the family told him that
Mrs. Cullen could not have unlocked the boat because they
had found the keys to the boat behind the door where they
belonged. He replied, ''Well, Sophie, I will tell you. There is
a different story about this whole thing than I have told, but
I think I might take it to my grave with me.'' In a conversation between Sophie and Bessie in his presence it was mentioned that a chemist found some blood in the house. The
defendant said: '' 'fhey did not, because I cleaned that house
np good four or five times.'' After Sophie left, he said to
Bessie: "Mary, I have got a secret that I might take to my
grave." She said, "Ray, I am not Mary. My name is Bessie."
The next day he told Bessie, ''Mary was prepared to die . . .
r baptized her. She was not satisfied with her baptism she had
when a girl, and she asked me to baptize her. She was prepared to die Monday." Bessie said, "Ray did you baptize
Dad?'' He said, ''You cannot baptize anybody that is dead.''
Asked what he meant, he said: ''Dad was stone dead on the
kitchen floor." And then, "Now, if I tell you any more, I
am going to jeopardize my defense." Asked why Mary did
not get a priest for the baptism he replied that she went bu1
the priest was not there that she didn't go back because she
didn't have time. The next day when she brought his rosaries, he asked her not to tell the priest that he had baptized
Mary, nor to tell anybody what he would tell her, but that
''Dad and Mary died in the house'' ; that he was outside and
heard two shots; that he found Dad lying dead on the floor
and Mary dying in the bathroom with a gun nearby and she
asked him to baptize her quick; that nothing could have been
done by calling a doctor who would find one with the skull
bashed in, one with the arm broken, shot through the stomach,
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and the
maslwd in. He said it would look bad for him
with his record and they would file a murder charge against
him "hnt they wouldn't get anywhere, because they had no
eorpus delicti." Numerous tests from the bathroom area
showAd no blood reaction. Asked where the bodies were he
said that the ;:;heriff's officers and AI and Billy walked right
over the evidence of bloody rags and a butcher knife; that jf
they hail gone into the house when they first investigated
they would have seen Boyer and Mary lying in there. Asked
if Boyer or Mary did the killing he replied that neither of
them ever harmed anybody, adding "I can't tell you any more.
'rher have no corpus delicti and if I say anything more to
you, T am going to jPopardize my defense." He told them
that he buried a jar with Mary's watch, $700 and some papers
and that a monk was keE'ping several thousand dollars for
him
rt is 1mneeE'ssary to detail othE'r inconsistent matters
ThE' clrfE>ndant's rrpE'tit.ion to the officE>rs that the deaths had
occurred in thE' house: his statemE'nt that he hired a man and
truck to take thE' bodies away for $125 and told the boat and
r·iver story bE>cause of his record; his attempts to bargain for
a manslaughter sentence if hE' told where the bodies were; his
statements that he knew where they were, that it would not
take long to find them; that he would not plead guilty to a
murder charge because he was afraid he would get the death
penalty but would consider pleading to SE'cond degree; that his
ouly hope was that they had no corpus delicti; that if he told
whE're the bodies were they could hang him for it; "I could
have put them in oil drums and hauled them away. I didn't
say I did. f said I could have. They can dig up the desert;
they can blow up the river, and they will never find them."
Toward: thE' end of February 1950, when an officer sought to
serve a subpoena, Boyhtari the neighbor was found dead in
his cabin with a !'lnicide notE' beside him datE'd ,January 17th.
The defE>ndant took the Rtand and told the story first rE>lated
by him and explained or attempted to E>xplain the incriminating
detaih; in the forE>going evidence. He testified that he had
signed the pE'nsion check with Boyer's name at the latter's
request and with his authority-a version suggested to him
by one of the sheriff's officE'rs. He claimed that he was put
tl1rough a brutal third degree and that his arms and legs were
twisted in an effort to get him to tell where the bodies were.
He did not divulge the location of the bodies nor did he confPss guilt.
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V.

'rhe purpose of the rule is to """""''"""'"'"
the possibility of fabricated testimony
establish the crime and the perpev.
169 Cal. 404, 409
P. 890]
v. De 11![artini, 50 Cal.App. 109, 113
P.

see,
506].)
'rhe
summary of the essential facts in the light of
the stated principles fully answers the defendant's contentions. [9] That the circumstantial evidence must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with an hypothesis of innocence, and that the proof of the corpus delicti and the identity
of: the perpetrator must resolve the guilt of the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt, are rules of instruction for the
guidance of the jury. [10] It is the function of the jury to
draw the proper inferences from the proof of the circumRtances. [11] It is not the province of the reviewing court
to ovrrturn the jury's verdict when it is supported by substantial evidence including the reasonable inferences to be
dra\Yll therefrom. (People v. Pm·kins, 8 Cal.2d 502, 511 [66
P.2d 631] ; People v. N cw7and, 15 Cal.2d 678, 682 [104 P.2d
778].) [12] The circumstances in evidence established a
prima facie showing of: the corpus delicti sufficient to allow
the ease, with the defendant's admissions, to go to the jury.
The circumstances also pointed to the defendant as the perpetrator and, together with the admissions, unquestionably
support the verdicts.
[13a] 'l'here is no merit in the contention that in ruling on
the admissibility of the defendant's declarations and statements thP court withdrew from the jury thP determination as
to \vhether the evidence established the corpus delicti. The
objection when first made was argued in the absence of the
jury and a ruling then indicated. In ruling on the repeated
objection the court stated in the jury's presence the previous
conclusion that the prosecution had produced prima facie
proof of the corpus delicti to satisfy the legal requirements
for admissibility of the defendant's declarations. The court
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immediately stated that the
evidence and the
ultimate determination was for the
[14] It was for the
court to determine whether the prima facie showing had been
made. [13b] If there was error in stating its determination in
the jury's presence, the effect was cured by the immediate instruction and subsequent fnll and proper instructions. In
Yiew of the conclusion hert>in as to the sufficiency of the eviclrnee, no misearriage of justiee nosultNl ryen if error on this
point be <1ssunwd. (Cf. Peoplr v. l'okra.iar. 206 Cal. 259 [274
P. 631; People v. Wilson, 61 Cal.App. 611, 622-623 f215 P .
.)65].)
[15] Prejuclice is asserted from the ruling whieh permittP!1
in evidence the rings handed to thr sl1eriff by Boyhtari in
accordance with testimony that the:v were similar to rings
concededly owned and worn by Mary Cullen. It is contended
that the evidence fails to establish that they vverr the ifh'ntieRl
rings which belonged to hrr. Similar complaint is made as
to other exhibits. Certain and positive identifieation was not
required. 'l'he evidence of similarity was sufficient to justify
the admission in evidence of the rings and the other objects,
the questions of weight and credibility being for the jury.
(People v. Ji'eTd·inand, 194 Cal. 555, 563-565 [229 P. 341] .)
[16] Objection is made to the court's ruling refusing a
subpoena to produce the bank records regarding the disposition
of the proceeds from the sale of Mary's Yucaipa property, or
to permit extended cross-examination of \Villiam Patton on
that subject. 'l'he ruling was grounded on the absence of an
inference in the evidence that the defendant had benefitted
from the sale of the property; therefore that the evidence
sought would not relate to a material fact or issue. The defendant does not refer to any testimony in the record and none
is discovered which would disclose that the court was mistaken
or was in rrror in its ruling.
[17] The defendant requesterl the trial eourt to appoint a
psr<>hiatrist to rxamine him whilr nndrr the influencr of
sodinm prntat.hol and offrrrrl proof as to the reliability of
the resnlt. The rrquest was denied and an offer of proof
rejected. Prejudicial error is asserted. 'l'he contention is
without merit. It is questionable whether the results of sueh
an examination would be admissible in evidence. (See People v. McNichol, 100 Cal.App.2d 554, 559 [224 P.2d 21].)
And the offer of proof indicated that the statements to be
prodnced would br hrarsay, srlf-srrving, and conj~ctural since
the truth thereof would depend entirely on the psychiatrist's
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whit.oh concciYHhly might eonftiet with the opinion of
another psychiatrist.
[18] 'l'here was no abuse of discretion in denying the
motion for change of place of trial or in disallowing the chalto the jury paneL The motion was submitted on conaffidavits from which the court could justifiably condude that at the time of the ruling and the trial the clamor
and
if any existed, had subsided and that there
was no reason why the defendant could not be tried impartially
and fairly
the jury selected. It is also to be assumed that
the court had some knowledge of conditions existing in the
eounty.
F'rom the defendant's statement at the time of sentence
it appeared that prior to August 1949 he had been tried in the
eounty on the murder eharge and that the jury had disagreed.
The present t1·ial commenced about a year and four months
after the disappearance of Mary and her father. There is no
showing that people in numbers attended the trial or that a
great deal of interest was manifested. In selecting the jury
:n veniremen 'vere examined. Two alternates were selected
fr·om eight additionaL The defendant did not exhaust his
peremptory challenges, having 11 remaining, and declined
the eourt 's offer to order a special venire if needed.
[19] 'l'he challenge to the jury panel appears to have been
based on the assertion that the members did not represent a
true cross-section of the citizens of Riverside County, but
were taken from a class of substantial citizens eager to serve ;
also that the jury list was not compiled in accordance with
Jaw bnt was permanent in character except for incidental deletions and additions. No eYidence is referred to except the
examination of the prospective jurors. That examination does
not support the contentions advanced. Some of those drawn
were men and women in business and other active work;
others were retired; some were wives and others were widows
of husbamls shown to have been in various walks of life.
J;~ifteen of those examined had had no previous jury experir~nee in California.
[20] It is claimed that one of the two alternates, neither
of whom became an active member of the jury, had served on
the grand jury the previous year and been discharged in
,January 1950 without disclosing the fact. Without participation in the verdict no prejudice resulted.
In People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 481-482 [229 P. 40], it
wa:; stated that a court may not be required to grant a motion

PEOPLE

was made. In that case a much shorter
between the events and the triaL In
6 CaL2d 759
P.2d
, the
of
Sacramento was the victim. The denial of
the motion and the renewed motion and the
to the
\vas based upon the trial court's fair
of
selected about five weeks after the homicide occurred.
As declared in those eases the matters were addressed to the
sound
of the trial court. Here there is no justification for a conclusion that the court committed an abuse of
discretion in denying the motion for a
of venue or
ln disallowing· the challenge to the jury paneL
The record discloses that the defendant had a fair and impartial trial and that the evidence fully supports the verdicts
of the
'fhe judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CAUTER, J.-I dissent.
In my opinion the evidence was insufficient to establish the
eorpus delicti, and the trial eourt committed prejudicial error
in stating in the presence of the jury that the corpus delicti
had been established.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and remand the
case for a new trial.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 23,
1951. Carter, .T., voted for a rehearing.

